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Abstract. From April 25 to April 30, 2010, the Dagstuhl Seminar 10171
Equilibrium Computation was held in Schloss Dagstuhl  Leibniz Cen-
ter for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented
their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were dis-
cussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well
as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper.
The ﬁrst section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links
to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
Keywords. Equilibrium computation, algorithmic game theory
10171 Executive Summary  Equilibrium Computation
The focus of this seminar was the algorithmic problem of computing equilibria
in games and market models, viewed from both the theoretical and practical
perspective. The equilibrium computation problem is one of the central topics
in the rapidly expanding ﬁeld of algorithmic game theory.
The seminar was a follow-up to Seminar 07471, on the same topic, but with
three new organizers, and with a focus on some of the aspects of this prob-
lem that received relatively little attention in Seminar 07471. One of the major
themes of this seminar was dynamics, i.e., exploring the agents' behavior (at
both individual and collective level) that leads to the discovery of equilibria,
and, more generally, adaptive changes in the collective behavior. Discussed were
the classic game-theoretic approaches to this topic (organizer: von Stengel) as
well as more recent computational and simulation-based techniques, as stud-
ied by the multi-agent community (organizer: Elkind). Another key emphasis
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was on algorithms and complexity results for market equilibria and their ap-
plications to Nash Bargaining Games (organizer: Vazirani). We also compared
these approaches with computational and geometric aspects of the central Lin-
ear Complementarity Problem (LCP) in mathematical programming (organizer:
Megiddo). Finally, since the last seminar there was signiﬁcant progress under-
standing the complexity of important algorithms, such as strategy iteration, for
solving two-player zero-sum games of inﬁnite duration. Progress in this area
has strong connections to mathematical programming and was discussed and
extended (organizer: Miltersen).
The following abstracts indicate the diversity of topics and their rich inter-
connections that were explored during a very successful seminar.
Viewing market price discovery as an algorithmic process
Richard Cole (New York University, US)
A basic tenet of well-functioning markets is that they converge toward equilib-
rium prices. This talk seeks to explain why this might be possible.
More speciﬁcally, we introduce the setting of Ongoing Markets (by contrast
with the classic Fisher and Exchange markets). An Ongoing Market allows trade
at non-equilibrium prices, and, as its name suggests, continues over time. Also,
we specify and analyze a (tatonnement-style) price update rule with the following
characteristics:
1. There is a separate instance of the (price update) procedure for each good.
2. The procedure is distributed: (i) the instances are independent, and (ii) each
instance uses limited "local" information.
3. It is simple.
4. It is asynchronous: price updates do not have to be simultaneous.
Furthermore, for appropriate markets the rule enables:
5. Fast convergence.
6. Robustness in the face of (somewhat) inaccurate data.
This talk is based on joint works with Lisa Fleischer and Ashish Rastogi.
A generalization of the min-max theorem to multiplayer
games
Constantinos Daskalakis (MIT  Cambridge, US)
According to Aumann, zero-sum games are "one of the few areas in game theory,
and indeed in the social sciences, where a fairly sharp, unique prediction is
made". We provide a generalization of the minmax theorem to multi-player
games. The games we consider are zero-sum polymatrixthat is, every pair of
players plays a (potentially diﬀerent) two-player game, and every outcome of
the global interaction has zero sum of all players' payoﬀs. Our generalization of
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the minmax theorem to this setting implies convexity of equilibria, polynomial-
time tractability, and convergence of no-regret learning algorithms to equilibria.
We show that our class of games is essentially the broadest class of multiplayer
zero-sum games to which we can hope to push tractability results.
And what about extending our results beyond zero-sum games? Previous
work has established that computing exact Nash equilibria is computationally
intractable, and research on approximation algorithms has made no progress
beyond ﬁnite values of approximation. Nevertheless, inapproximability results
have been evading current techniques. We provide the ﬁrst inapproximability
result for Nash equilibria in two-player games, for constant values of relative
approximation.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
Competitive Equilibrium at Advertising Marketplaces
Xiaotie Deng (City University  Hong Kong, CN)
We apply the competitive equilibrium formulation to study an advertising mar-
ket problem where each position has an associated parameter called circulation,
quantifying the worth of the position, e.g., the number of viewers in TV adver-
tising, or the average amount of clicks for each 1000 impressions in keywords
advertising. Each advertiser has a value constraint which refers to his maximum
amount for one unit circulation, and a total budget constraint for all circulations
in a position. In an output of the market, a matching between advertisers and
positions is established and a price-per-circulation of each position is charged.
The problem is known not to guarantee an integral equilibrium. Nevertheless
of the non-existence, we develop a strongly polynomial time algorithm to deter-
mine whether there is an equilibrium, and to compute a minimum one, where the
total payment of advertisers is the minimum. Our algorithm can be extended to
ﬁnd an equilibrium with an opposite objective that maximizes the total proﬁt of
the publisher. Further, we establish the existence of an equilibrium, in particular
when the budgets of advertisers are distinct, a mild condition that can, arguably,
be reenforced. Finally, we consider a natural mechanism based on the minimum
equilibrium and prove it is incentive compatible.
Our results open up the possibility of a new solution for pricing an advertising
market by its general equilibrium, and shed new light on possible algorithmic
solutions for the emerging ad exchanges.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
Joint work of: Chen, Ning; Deng, Xiaotie
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A new convex program for Fisher markets and convergence
of proportional response dynamics
Nikhil R. Devanur (Microsoft Research  Redmond, US)
We give a new convex program that captures the equilibrium of linear Fisher
markets.
This is an alternate to the well known Eisenberg-Gale convex program that
has been known and studied for a long time (since 1959).
This new program naturally extends to the case of spending constraint util-
ities, thus resolving the open problem of whether there exists a convex program
for such utilities. The new program also helps us demystify the convergence
properties of "proportional response" dynamics: a simple, distributed way to
converge to market equilibria.
We show that the proportional response dynamics is equivalent to gradient
descent on the new convex program, with KL-divergence instead of Euclidean
distance. In addition to providing insight, this allows us to give improved bounds
on the convergence rate.
Manuscript available from
Full Paper:
http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/nikdev/
Equilibria of Plurality Voting with Abstentions
Edith Elkind (Nanyang TU  Singapore, SG)
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of
manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate
elected, while the remaining voters are truthful.
In this paper, we depart from this assumption, and consider the setting where
all voters are strategic.
In this case, the election can be viewed as a game, and the election outcomes
correspond to Nash equilibria of this game. We use this framework to analyze
two variants of Plurality voting, namely, simultaneous voting, where all voters
submit their ballots at the same time, and sequential voting, where the voters
express their preferences one by one. For simultaneous voting, we characterize
the preference proﬁles that admit a pure Nash equilibrium, but show that it is
computationally hard to check if a given proﬁle ﬁts our criterion.
For sequential voting, we provide a complete analysis of the setting with
two candidates, and show that for three or more candidates the equilibria of
sequential voting may behave in a counterintuitive manner.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
Joint work of: Desmedt, Yvo; Elkind, Edith
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Adding Recursion to Markov Chains, Markov Decision
Processes, and Stochastic Games: Algorithms and
Complexity
Kousha Etessami (University of Edinburgh, GB)
I will decribe a family of ﬁnitely presented, but inﬁnite-state, stochastic models
and stochastic games that arise by adding a natural recursion feature to Markov
Chains, Markov Decision Processes, and Stochastic Games.
These recursive models subsume a number of classic and heavily studied
stochastic processes, including (multi-type) branching processes, (quasi-)-birth-
death processes, stochastic context-free grammars, and many others. They also
provide a natural abstract model of probabilistic procedural programs with re-
cursion.
The algorithmic theory and computational complexity of analyzing these
models has turned out to be very rich, with connections to a number of areas of
research. In particular, a key role is played in their analysis by ﬁxed point compu-
tation problems for algebraically deﬁned functions over basis +, *, max, min, and
there are connections between some of these problems and long standing open
problems in numerical computation, as well as connections to the computation
and approximation of Nash Equilibria.
I will survey highlights from our work on these recursive stochastic models
and games. There remain many open questions about the complexity of basic
analysis problems for them. I will highlight a few key open problems.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
Joint work of: Etessami, Kousha; Yannakakis, Mihalis
Exponential Lower Bounds for Strategy Iteration
Oliver Friedmann (LMU München, DE)
We present a new exponential lower bound for the two most popular deter-
ministic variants of the strategy improvement algorithm for solving parity, mean
payoﬀ, discounted payoﬀ and simple stochastic games. The ﬁrst variant improves
every node in each step maximizing the current valuation locally, whereas the sec-
ond variant computes the optimal improvement in each step. We outline families
of games on which both variants require exponentially many strategy iterations.
Finally, we brieﬂy describe how to adapt the idea to get a concrete lower bound
for the random facet policy.
Keywords: Policy iteration, parity games, lower bounds
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Stochastic games with signals: decidable and undecidable
problems
Hugo Gimbert (Université Bordeaux, FR)
We consider two-player stochastic games with signals.
These games are similar to the original stochastic games introduced by Shap-
ley except for the signals.
These signals are used to model imperfect monitoring: the players cannot
observe directly the state of the game, instead they base their decisions on the
sequence of signals they receive during the play.
We present several decidability and undecidability results for these games
equipped with reachability conditions: for example values are not computable
but it is decidable whether a player has a strategy to win almost-surely.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
A perfect price discrimination market, its welfare
theorems, and an eﬃcient algorithm for computing its
equilibria
Gagan Goel (Georgia Institute of Technology, US)
We present a simple market model which allows for perfect price discrimination
and we give a notion of equilibrium for it. We also give a convex program, a
generalization of the classic Eisenberg-Gale convex program, that captures all
equilibria for this market. This program gives us surprisingly simple proofs of
both welfare theorems for this market. Finally, we give a combinatorial, polyno-
mial time algorithm for ﬁnding an equilibrium and a characterization of the set
of all equilibria.
Joint work of: Goel, Gagan; Vazirani, Vijay
Nucleolus Computation in Compact Coalitional Games
Gianluigi Greco (University of Calabria, IT)
A coalitional game is played by a set of players that can form coalitions in order
to guarantee themselves some advantage. Each coalition is assigned a certain
worth that players in it can obtain if collaborating with each other, and the out-
come of the game is a vector of payoﬀs that is meant to specify the distribution
of the worth granted to each player in the game. A fundamental problem for
coalitional games is to deﬁne the most desirable outcomes in terms of appropri-
ate notions of fair worth distributions. The talk focuses on characterizing the
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computational complexity of the nucleolus, which is a very prominent solution
concept of fairness in coalitional games. In particular, we consider games that are
speciﬁed in succinct form (i.e., the worth function is given as polynomial-time
oracle) and we show that the nucleolus can be computed in F∆P2 in this set-
ting. Thus, checking whether a given imputation is the nucleolus of a succinctly
speciﬁed game is feasible in ∆P2 . In fact, we show that the result is tight, since
∆P2 -hardness holds even on the class of graph games.
Keywords: Coalitional games, Computational Complexity
Full Paper:
http://ijcai.org/papers09/Papers/IJCAI09-035.pdf
A New Result on the Complex of Maximal Lattice Free
Bodies Arising from a matrix of size (n+1) × n
Bjarke Hammersholt Roune (Aarhus University, DK)
We consider the collection of Maximal Lattice Free Bodies arising from a well
behaved matrix of size (n + 1) by n. When n = 2, the bodies consist of a pair
of triangles, whose union is a parallelogram of unit area  and all of their lattice
translates. When n = 3, the bodies are tetrahedra, whose vertices are integral
and which contain no other lattice points in their interior or on their boundary.
A theorem from 1985, with an impossible opaque argument, states that all of
these tetrahedra have a lattice width of 0 or 1 in the SAME lattice direction.
We present a simple argument based on the new result that the collection of
MLFBs contains a pair of triangles (0, a, a+ b), (0, b, a+ b).
Joint work of: Scarf, Herbert
Hardness of approximating minmax in 3-player games
Kristoﬀer Arnsfelt Hansen (Aarhus University, DK)
For computing the minmax value for a given player in 3-player normal form
games we provide the following results: For any constant  > 0, the minmax
value can be approximated to an additive error  > 0 in quasipolynomial time.
It is known that obtaining an additive error 1/n for any  > 0 is NP-hard.
We give a reduction from the k-clique problem, which additionally implies W[1]
hardness if the problem is paramerized by the number k of strategies for the
given player. Finally, assuming hardness of the so-called planted clique problem,
we show that it is not possible to approximate the minmax value to any constant
additive error  > 0 in polynomial time.
Joint work of: Hansen, Kristoﬀer Arnsfelt; Hansen, Thomas Dueholm; Mil-
tersen, Peter Bro; Sørensen, Troels Bjerre; Verbin, Elad
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A subexponential lower bound for the Random Facet
algorithm for Parity Games
Thomas Dueholm Hansen (Aarhus University, DK)
Parity Games form an intriguing family of inﬁnite duration games whose solution
is equivalent to the solution of important problems in automatic veriﬁcation and
automata theory. They also form a very natural subclass of Deterministic Mean
Payoﬀ Games, which in turn is a very natural subclass of turn-based Stochastic
Mean Payoﬀ Games. It is a major open problem whether these game families
can be solved in polynomial time.
The currently fastest algorithms for the solution of all these games are adap-
tations of the randomized algorithms of Kalai and of Matousek, Sharir and
Welzl for LP-type problems, an abstract generalization of linear programming.
We refer to the algorithm of Matousek, Sharir and Welzl as the Random Facet
algorithm. The expected running time of these algorithms is subexponential in
the size of the game, i.e., 2O(
√
n logn), where n is the number of vertices in the
game. Matousek constructed a family of abstract optimization problems such
that the expected running time of the Random Facet algorithm, when run on a
random instance from this family, is close to the subexponential upper bound
given above. This shows that in the abstract setting, the 2O(
√
n logn) upper bound
on the complexity of the Random Facet algorithm is essentially tight.
It is not known, however, whether the abstract optimization problems con-
structed by Matousek correspond to games of any of the families mentioned
above. (It is, in fact, unlikely that they do.) There was some hope, therefore,
that the Random Facet algorithm, when applied to, say, parity games, may
run in polynomial time. We show, unfortunately, that this is not the case by
constructing explicit parity games on which the expected running time of the
Random Facet algorithm is close to the subexponential upper bound.
Our parity games are obtained by modifying the parity games used recently
by Friedmann to show that the standard deterministic policy iteration algorithm
for parity games runs in exponential time. They, in a sense, implement a ran-
domized counter. They are also the ﬁrst explicit LP-type problems on which the
Random Facet algorithm is not polynomial.
Joint work of: Friedmann, Oliver; Hansen, Thomas Dueholm; Zwick, Uri
Dynamics and Equilibria
Sergiu Hart (The Hebrew University at Jerusalem, IL)
It is a fact that in the existing literature there are no general natural dynamics
leading to Nash equilibria. The talk provides an overview of research that sheds
light on this and related issues.
We provide an overview of recent work on dynamical systems in multi-player
environments. On the one hand, the natural informational restriction that each
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participant does not know the payoﬀ functions of the other participants  "un-
coupledness"  severely limits the possibilities to converge to Nash equilibria. On
the other hand, there are simple adaptive heuristics  such as "regret matching"
 that lead in the long run to correlated equilibria, a concept that embodies full
rationality. Connections to behavioral economics, neurobiological studies, and
engineering, are also mentioned.
Full Paper:
http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/dyn-p.html
Solving Simple Stochastic Tail Games
Florian Horn (University Paris-Diderot, FR)
Stochastic games are a natural model for open reactive processes: one player rep-
resents the controller and his opponent represents a hostile environnment. Teh
evolution of the system depends on the decisions of the players, supplemented
by random transitions. There are two main algorithmic problems on such games:
computing the values (quantitative analysis) and deciding whether a player can
win with probability 1 (qualitative analysis). In this paper we reduce the quan-
titative analysis of simple stochastic tail games to the qualitative analysis: we
provide an algorithm for computing values which uses qualitative analysis as a
sub-procedure. The correctness proof of this algorithm reveals several nice prop-
erties of perfect-information stochastic tail games, in particular the existence of
optimal strategies. We apply these results to games whose winning conditions
are boolean combinations of mean-payoﬀ and Büchi conditions.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
Joint work of: Gimbert, Hugo; Horn, Florian
Lemke's algorithm for discounted games
Marcin Jurdzinski (University of Warwick, GB)
The performance of a pivoting algorithm due to Lemke is considered on linear
complementarity problems (LCPs) that arise from discounted games. The algo-
rithm has not been previously studied in the context of inﬁnite games, and it
oﬀers an alternative to the classical strategy-improvement algorithms. The al-
gorithm is described purely in terms of discounted games, thus bypassing the
reduction from the games to LCPs, and hence facilitating a better understand-
ing of the algorithm when applied to games. A family of discounted games is
given on which the algorithm runs in exponential time, indicating that in the
worst case it performs no better for discounted games than it does for general
P-matrix LCPs.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
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Computational Mechanism Analysis: Leveraging
Equilibrium Computation to Understand Real-World
Mechanisms
Kevin Leyton-Brown (University of British Columbia  Vancouver, CA)
Many mechanisms become important "in the wild" despite a lack of theoretical
arguments in their favor, chieﬂy because their complexity precludes analysis by
existing techniques. This talk advocates the creation of computational tools for
describing and empirically analyzing the equilibria of such mechanisms. This
agenda raises a host of new theoretical problems: identifying representations
that compactly represent interesting classes of games; determining encodings of
mechanisms of interest into these representations; and deriving eﬃcient proce-
dures for computing solution concepts of interest given these encodings. Recently,
we have begun to take steps to make this agenda concrete. Speciﬁcally, I will
describe "Action Graph Games", a compact encoding for perfect-information
games in which agents' payoﬀs exhibit context-free independencies. I will show
how this representation can be used to encode sponsored search mechanisms,
and will characterize resulting equilibrium behavior both in terms of social wel-
fare and revenue. I will also outline some recent extensions of our representation
to encompass Bayesian games.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
Coalitional Bargaining; How Complex Is It?
Andrew McLennan (The University of Queensland  Brisbane, AU)
We consider a model of coalitional bargaining in which, in each period, a proposer
is selected randomly, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, and
there is an election in which each agents votes for or against the proposal. If
the set of agents voting for the proposal is a winning coalition, the proposal
is implemented, and otherwise the process is repeated in the next period with
discounted payoﬀs. We show that there is a unique vector of expected equilibrium
payoﬀs generated by every stationary equilibrium. The proof uses index theory,
and does not imply an algorithm for computing the vector. Veriﬁcation of the
vector is a linear program, so the problem of computing the vector is NP-like
(possibly diﬃcult to ﬁnd, but easy to verify) but the equations are nonlinear, so
the components of the vector need not be rational.
Keywords: Coalitional bargaining, FIXP, PPAD
Joint work of: McLennan, Andrew; Hulya Eraslan
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Finding Gale Strings
Julian Merschen (London School of Economics, GB)
The problem 2-NASH of ﬁnding a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game belongs
to the complexity class PPAD. This class comprises computational problems
that are known to have a solution by means of a path-following argument. For
bimatrix games, this argument is provided by the Lemke-Howson algorithm.
It has been shown that this algorithm is worst-case exponential with the help
of dual cyclic polytopes, where the algorithm can be expressed combinatori-
ally via labeled bitstrings deﬁned by the `Gale evenness condition' that char-
acterize the vertices of these polytopes. We deﬁne the combinatorial problem
ANOTHER COMPLETELY LABELED GALE STRING whose solutions de-
ﬁne the Nash equilibria of games deﬁned by cyclic polytopes, including games
where the Lemke-Howson algorithm takes exponential time. If this problem was
PPAD-complete, this would imply that 2-NASH is PPAD-complete, in a much
simpler way than the currently known proofs, including the original proof by
Chen and Deng [3]. However, we show that ANOTHER COMPLETELY LA-
BELED GALE STRING is solvable in polynomial time by a simple reduction to
PERFECT MATCHING in graphs, making it unlikely to be PPAD-complete.
Although this result is negative, we hope that it stimulates research into com-
binatorially deﬁned problems that are PPAD-complete and imply this property
for 2-NASH.
Keywords: Nash Equilibria, Lemke-Howson, PPAD, Perfect Matching, Oiks,
Gale Strings
Joint work of: Casetti, Marta; Merschen, Julian; von Stengel, Bernhard
Full Paper:
http://www.maths.lse.ac.uk/Personal/stengel/TEXTE/ge-ISCO.pdf
The complexity of solving reachability games using value
and strategy iteration
Peter Bro Miltersen (Aarhus University, DK)
Concurrent reachability games is a class of games heavily studied by the com-
puter science community, in particular by the formal methods community. Two
standard algorithms for approximately solving two-player zero-sum concurrent
reachability games are value iteration and strategy iteration. A rigorous com-
plexity analysis of these algorithms has been an open problem until now. We
prove a lower bound of 2m
Ω(N)
on the worst case number of iterations needed
for both of these algorithms to provide non-trivial approximations to the value
of a game with N non-terminal positions and m actions for each player in each
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position. In particular, both algorithms have at least doubly-exponential com-
plexity. Also, even when the game given as input has only one non-terminal
position, we prove an exponential lower bound on their time complexities. The
instances establishing the lower bound may be regarded as natural rather than
pathological and our proofs of the lower bounds proceed by arguing about these
instances as games, using game-theoretic concepts and tools. We also give not-
quite-matching 22
O(mN)
upper bounds on the number of iterations suﬃcient for
getting adequate approximate values, by each of these algorithms. In particular,
both algorithms are also of at most doubly-exponential complexity.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
Joint work of: Hansen, Kristoﬀer Arnsfelt; Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus; Miltersen,
Peter Bro
The P-matrix linear complementarity problem: survey of
complexity results
Walter Morris (George Mason University  Fairfax, US)
The P-matrix linear problem is that of ﬁnding, given a square matrix M and
vector q, either a solution to the linear complementarity problem with input
M and q or a nonpositive principal minor of the matrix M. This problem is
in PPAD, and Megiddo showed that NP-hardness of the problem would imply
NP = Co-NP. A large variety of complexity classes is associated to diﬀerent
specializations of this problem. Some instances of this problem can be solved
by considering a related linear program, as was observed by Mangasarian and
Cottle and Pang in the 1970s. We contrast those instances for which this and
related approaches work with the instances for which they do not.
Improved Algorithms for Computing Fisher's Market
Clearing Prices
James B. Orlin (MIT  Cambridge, US)
We give the ﬁrst strongly polynomial time algorithm for computing an equilib-
rium for the linear utilities case of Fisher's market model.
We consider a problem with a set B of buyers and a set G of divisible goods.
Each buyer i starts with an initial integral allocation ei of money. The integral
utility for buyer i of good j is Uij . We ﬁrst develop a weakly polynomial time
algorithm that runs in O(n4 logUmax + n3emax) time, where n = |B|+ |G|. We
further modify the algorithm so that it runs inO(n4 log n) time. These algorithms
improve upon the
previous best running time of O(n8 logUmax + n7 log emax), due to Devanur
et al.
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Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2672
Computing equilibria: the plot thickens
Christos H. Papadimitriou (University of California  Berkeley, US)
We show new complexity results regarding Nash equilibria in the face of risk,
equilibrium selection à la Harsanyi-Selten, and equilibria in economies with con-
concave production.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
Congestion-Averse Games
Maria Polukarov (University of Southampton, GB)
Congestion games  in which players strategically choose from a set of resources
and derive utilities that depend on the congestion on each resource  are im-
portant in a wide range of applications. However, to date, such games have
been constrained to use utility functions that are linear sums with respect to re-
sources. To remove this restriction, we consider a generalisation to the case where
a player's payoﬀ can be given by any real-valued function over the set of possible
congestion vectors. Under weak assumptions on the structure of player strategy
spaces, we constructively prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for
the very wide class of these generalised games in which player utility functions
are congestion-averse  i.e., monotonic, submodular and independent of irrele-
vant alternatives. Although, as we show, these games do not admit a generalised
ordinal potential function (and hence  the ﬁnite improvement property), any
such game does possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. A polynomial time
algorithm for computing such an equilibrium is presented.
Moreover, we show that if a player utility function does not satisfy any one of
the congestion-averse conditions, then a pure strategy equilibrium need not exist,
and in fact the determination of whether or not a game has a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium is NP-complete. We further prove analogous results for our assumed
properties of player strategy spaces, thus showing that current assumptions on
strategy and utility structures in this model cannot be relaxed anymore.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
Joint work of: Byde, Andrew; Jennings, Nick; Polukarov, Maria; Voice, Thomas
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Computing stable outcomes in hedonic games
Rahul Savani (University of Liverpool, GB)
We study the computational complexity of ﬁnding stable outcomes in additively-
separable symmetric hedonic games. These coalition formation games are speci-
ﬁed by an undirected edge-weighted graph: nodes are players, an outcome of the
game is a partition of the nodes into coalitions, and the utility of a node is the
sum of incident edge weights in the same coalition. We consider several natural
stability requirements deﬁned in the economics literature. For all of them the
existence of a stable outcome is guaranteed by a potential function argument,
and local improvements will converge to a stable outcome. The diﬀerent stability
requirements correspond to diﬀerent local search neighbourhoods. For diﬀerent
neighbourhood structures, our ﬁndings comprise positive results in the form of
polynomial-time algorithms, and negative (PLS-completeness) results.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
Joint work of: Gairing, Martin; Savani, Rahul
Computing Pure Nash and Strong Equilibria in Bottleneck
Congestion Games
Alexander Skopalik (RWTH Aachen, DE)
Bottleneck congestion games properly model the properties of many real-world
network routing applications. They are known to possess strong equilibria  a
strengthening of Nash equilibrium to resilience against coalitional deviations.
In this paper, we study the computational complexity of pure Nash and strong
equilibria in these games. We provide a generic centralized algorithm to compute
strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games. It has polynomial running time
for many interesting classes of games such as, e.g., matroid or single-commodity
games.
In addition, we examine the more demanding goal to reach equilibria in poly-
nomial time using natural improvement dynamics. Using unilateral improvement
dynamics in matroid games pure Nash equilibria can be reached eﬃciently. In
contrast, computing even a single coalitional improvement move in matroid and
single-commodity games is strongly NP-hard. In addition, we establish a variety
of hardness results and lower bounds regarding the duration of unilateral and
coalitional improvement dynamics. They are extended to hold even for conver-
gence to approximate equilibria.
Joint work of: Harks, Tobias; Hoefer, Martin; Klimm, Max; Skopalik, Alexander
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The computational complexity of trembling hand
perfection and other equilibrium reﬁnements
Troels Bjerre Sorensen (University of Warwick, GB)
The king of reﬁnements of Nash equilibrium is trembling hand perfection. We
show that it is NP-hard and SQRT-SUM-hard to decide if a given pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of a given three-player game in strategic form with integer
payoﬀs is trembling hand perfect. Analogous results are shown for a number
of other solution concepts, including proper equilibrium, (the strategy part of)
sequential equilbrium, quasi-perfect equilibrium and CURB. The proofs all use
a reduction from the problem of comparing the minmax value of a three-player
game in strategic form to a given rational number. This problem was previously
shown to be NP-hard by Borgs et al., while a SQRT-SUM hardness result is
given in this paper. The latter proof yields bounds on the algebraic degree of
the minmax value of a three-player game that may be of independent interest.
We remark that the question answered by this paper was raised during the
previous Dagstuhl seminar on Equilibrium computation (seminar 07471) .
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
Joint work of: Hansen, Kristoﬀer Arnsfelt; Miltersen, Peter Bro; Sorensen,
Troels Bjerre
An algorithmic proof of Afriat's theorem on consumer
behavior and related questions
Michael J. Todd (Cornell University, US)
We give an algorithmic proof of a theorem of Afriat characterizing when a set
of demand data arises from utility maximization, and discuss related questions.
Afriat's theorem shows that some obviously necessary conditions are also suﬃ-
cient. We give an inductive proof that leads to an algorithm that either produces
a possible utility function or shows that none exists in O((m+n)n2) operations,
where there are m goods and n demand vector-price vector pairs.
Keywords: Consumer behavior; demand rationalization; utility maximixation
Joint work of: Todd, Michael; Fostel, Ana; Scarf, Herb
Full Paper:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/b2da6l6dvjljxrl0/?p=62c6c53692eb432f9d28ddc112209424
16 Edith Elkind, Nimrod Megiddo, Peter Bro Miltersen, Bernhard von
Stengel and Vijay Vazirani
Proportional Response as Iterated Cobb-Douglas
Michael J. Todd (Cornell University, US)
We show that the proportional response algorithm for computing an economic
equilibrium in a Fisher market model can be interpreted as iteratively approxi-
mating the economy by one with Cobb-Douglas utilities, for which a closed-form
equilibrium can be obtained.
We also extend the method to allow elasticities of substitution at most one.
Keywords: Computing equilibria, Fisher market, proportional response algo-
rithm, Cobb-Douglas utilities
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2671
Market Equilibrium: the Quest for the "Right" Model
Vijay V. Vazirani (Georgia Institute of Technology, US)
The search for eﬃcient algorithms for computing market equilibria had not only
an academic goal, i.e., providing an algorithmic ratiﬁcation of Adam Smith's
invisible hand of the market, but was also motivated by potential applications
to the plethora of new and highly lucrative markets that have emerged on the
Internet.
However, this program was recently dealt a serious blow, with results show-
ing that the problem of computing an equilibrium under even additively separa-
ble, piecewise-linear, concave utilities (plc utilities) is PPAD-complete for both
Arrow-Debreu and Fisher market models. Assuming P 6= PPAD, this eﬀectively
rules out the existence of eﬃcient algorithms for almost all general and interest-
ing classes of traditional market models.
On the other hand, markets in the West, based on Adam Smith's free market
principle, seem to do a good job of ﬁnding prices that maintain parity between
supply and demand. This has prompted the question of whether we have failed
to capture some essential elements of real markets in our models, and what is
the right model which is not only realistic and admits equilibria but is also
amenable to eﬃcient computation of equilibria.
We will give evidence that there is plenty of scope of doing creative work on
this question.
Full Paper:
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/∼vazirani/Dagstuhl-2010.ppt
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On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed
Points
Mihalis Yannakakis (Columbia University, US)
We reexamine what it means to compute Nash equilibria and, more generally,
what it means to compute a ﬁxed point of a given Brouwer function, and we
investigate the complexity of the associated problems. Speciﬁcally, we study the
complexity of the following problem: given a ﬁnite game, Γ , with 3 or more
players, and given  > 0, compute an approximation within  of some (actual)
Nash equilibrium. We show that approximation of an actual Nash Equilibrium,
even to within any non-trivial constant additive factor  < 1/2 in just one desired
coordinate, is at least as hard as the long standing square-root sum problem,
as well as a more general arithmetic circuit decision problem that characterizes
P-time in a unit-cost model of computation with arbitrary precision rational
arithmetic; thus placing the approximation problem in P, or even NP, would
resolve major open problems in the complexity of numerical computation.
We show similar results for market equilibria: it is hard to estimate with any
nontrivial accuracy the equilibrium prices in an exchange economy with a unique
equilibrium, where the economy is given by explicit algebraic formulas for the
excess demand functions.
We deﬁne a class, FIXP, which captures search problems that can be cast
as ﬁxed point computation problems for functions represented by algebraic cir-
cuits (straight line programs) over basis {+, ∗,−, /,max,min} with rational con-
stants. We show that the (exact or approximate) computation of Nash equilibria
for 3 or more players is complete for FIXP. The price equilibrium problem for
exchange economies with algebraic demand functions is another FIXP-complete
problem. We show that the piecewise linear fragment of FIXP equals PPAD.
Many other problems in game theory, economics, and probability theory,
can be cast as ﬁxed point problems for such algebraic functions. We discuss
several important such problems: computing the value of Shapley's stochastic
games, and the simpler games of Condon, extinction probabilities of branching
processes, probabilities of stochastic context-free grammars, and termination
probabilities of Recursive Markov Chains. We show that for some of them, the
approximation, or even exact computation, problem can be placed in PPAD,
while for others, they are at least as hard as the square-root sum and arithmetic
circuit decision problems.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
Joint work of: Etessami, Kousha; Yannakakis, Mihalis
18 Edith Elkind, Nimrod Megiddo, Peter Bro Miltersen, Bernhard von
Stengel and Vijay Vazirani
Homotopy methods for ﬁnding quantal response equilibria
Boyu Zhang (Universität Wien, AT)
Following Mckelvey and Palfrey, we study the quantal response equilibria for
2 × 2 bimatrix games. Based on homotopy methods, we ﬁnd a simple rule to
decide which equilibrium is selected for given payoﬀ matrix. Generally, this rule
is independent of the distribution of the random error.
Keywords: Quantal response equilbria, homotopy methods, equilibrium selec-
tion
Local Improvement/Policy Iteration Algorithms
Uri Zwick (Tel Aviv University, IL)
Policy Iteration algorithms form a simple family of algorithms that can be ap-
plied in many diﬀerent settings, ranging from the relatively simple problem of
ﬁnding a minimum mean weight cycle in a graph, the more challenging solution
of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), to the solution of 2-player full informa-
tion stochastic games, also known as Simple Stochastic Games (SSGs).
It was recently shown by Fridmann that the worst case running time of a
natural deterministic version of the policy iteration algorithm, when applied
to Parity Games (PGs), is exponential. It is still open, however, whether de-
terministic policy iteration algorithm can solve Markov Decision Processes in
polynomial time, and whether randomized policy iteration algorithms can solve
Simple Stochastic Games in polynomial time.
The talk will survey what is known regarding policy iteration algorithms and
mention many intriguing open problems.
Keywords: Equilibrium Computation
